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BILLS AND NoTBs-LlMxTATION OF ACTIONS-RUNNING oF THB STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS AGAINST THE HOLDER OF A CmcK-Defendant issued a check
to plaintiff's intestate on July 1, 1942 for services rendered. On April 21, 1943,
the payee deposited the check in her bank, but it was returned to her uncollected because the bank on which it was drawn refused to make payment on
account of its "stale" date. Nothing further was done to enforce payment of
the check during the payee's lifetime, and she died on September 20, 1948.
This action on the check was brought by her administrator on July 28, 1949.
On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, held~ the action is barred by the
statute of limitations. Being a demand instrument, the action should have been
commenced within six years from the date of issue, by July 1, 1948. Farrell 11.
City of New York, (N.Y. 1950) 98 N.Y.S. (2d) 56.
The court's decision in the principal case is based on its declaration that the
statute of limitations begins to run on a check from the date of issuance. It is
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true that under the Negotiable Instruments Law the maker of a demand note
is primarily liable thereon immediately after issuance regardless of demand, and
an action therefore accrues to the payee immediately.1 But such is not the case
in regard to checks; rather the drawer is only secondarily liable.2 Accordingly,
he is ordinarily not liable until presentment for payment and subsequent dishonor by the drawee.8 The N.I.L. provides that "except as herein otherwise
provided, presentment for payment is necessary in order to charge the drawer
and indorsers,"4 and that it is not until the instrument is dishonored by nonpayment, that "an immediate right of recourse to all parties secondarily liable
thereon accrues to the holder."5 It is when a cause of action accrues so that
suit may properly be brought thereon that the running of the statute of limitations begins.6 The rule is no different for checks. ''The period of limitations
runs from the date of dishonor, since the cause of action then arises.'' 7 In the
case of checks this rule gives rise to a situation in which the holder, by his own
failure to act, may be able to delay indefinitely the running of the statute. Consequently many cases have evolved the theory that the statute will begin to run
after a reasonable time in which plaintiff could have made presentment,
rather than after presentment and dishonor. 8 Under either view, however, the
statute does not begin to run at tl1e issuance of a check. Had the court in the
principal case correctly determined the time at which the statutory period began
to run, it might have reached the same result; that is, that the action was barred
by the statute of limitations. Nevertheless, without deciding that question, it can
1 N.I.L. §70; Shuman v. Citizens State Bank of Rugby, 27 N.D. 599, 147 N.W. 388
(1914); Esslinger v. Spragins, 236 Ala. 508, 183 S. 401 (1938).
2N.I.L. §192; Binghampton Pharmacy v. First Nat. Bank, 131 Tenn. 711, 176 S.W.
1038 (1915).
s N.I.L. §61; Fick v. Jones, 185 Wash. 365, 55 P. (2d) 334 (1936); Wachtel v.
Rosen, 249 N.Y. 386, 164 N.E. 326 (1928); First Nat. Bank of Belle Plaine v. McConnell,
103 Minn. 340, 114 N.W. 1129 (1908); Haynes v. Wesley, 112 Ga. 668, 37 S.E. 990
(1900). See also 25 MmN. L. REv. 371 (1941).
4 Sec. 70. The rule was the same at common law. See Fick v. Jones, 185 Wash. 365,
55 P. (2d) 334 (1936); Rodriguez v. Hardouin, 15 La. App. 112, 131 S. 593 (1930),
holding that the N.I.L. has not changed the rule that the holder of a check payable to his
order cannot bring suit against the drawer without proving presentment to the drawee and
refusal of payment.
5 Sec. 84; Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U.S. 470, 25 L.Ed. 228 (1878); Sweester v. Fox, 43
Utah 40, 134 P. 599 (1913).
6 Dusek v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (7th Cir. 1933) 68 F. (2d) 131; Paulson v. United
States, (10th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 97; Bass v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit,
(4th Cir. 1934) 70 F. (2d) 86; Smith v. Smith, 231 Ky. 229, 21 S.W. (2d) 246 (1929);
Conway v. Plank, 136 Misc. 403, 243 N.Y.S. 215 (1930).
7BIGBLow, BILLs, NOTBs AND CHBcxs, 3d ed. by W. M. Lile, §540 (1928); In re
Boyse, 33 Ch. Div. 612, 56 L.J. Reports (Ch. Div.) 135 (1886). See also Haynes v.
Wesley, 112 Ga. 668, 37 S.E. 990 (1900); Wright v. MacCarty, 92 ill. App. 120 (1900).
8 For a discussion of this view in relation to Dean v. Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank &
Trust Co., 227 Iowa 1239, 290 N.W. 664 (1940), see 25 MmN. L. REv. 371 (1941);
38 MxcH. L. REv. 90 (1939). Accord: Wagner & Co. v. Smith, 114 S.C. 159, 103 S.E.
527 (1920); Wrigley v. Farmers and Mechanics State Bank of Beatrice, 76 Neb. 862, 108
N.W. 132 (1906); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. American Nat. Bank, 165 Tenn. 66,
52
(2d) 149 (1932).

s.w.
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be said that the court was clearly in error in declaring that the statute
begins to run at the time a check is issued. Further, the view indicated
by Professor Simpson, in the New York University Law School Annual
Survey for 1949, that in view of section 186 of the N. I. L. an action may
be maintained by a checkholder against the drawer without presentment
(that lack of presentment and notice are matters of defense in the case of
checks), may well be doubted. It would seem to warp a provision covering a
particular situation into one implying a general rule.
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